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Therefore, much of Louisiana's elaborate old jurisprudence restricting
trusts and prohibiting substitutions has no counterpart in Puerto Rican law.
Puerto Rico's domestic civil law remained Spanish law after Puerto Rico
became a territory of the United States in 1898. Since then, Puerto Rico has
been a commonwealth under various organic acts of the United States
Congress. Puerto Rico's people now have United States citizenship, com-
mon defense and common markets with the 50 states, and are subject only
to United States federal control of customs, interstate trade, post office
operations, the Coast Guard and adjudication of law suits involving federal
jurisdiction.
A principal source for the choice of law and administrative provisions of
Sections 8 through 12 of the proposed Trust Code is the New York Estates,
Powers and Trusts Law, adopted there after years of study and analysis by
the New York State Temporary Commission on the Law of Estates. The
New York law is a useful model for these provisions, not only because of its
comprehensiveness, but also because of the numerous business and finan-
cial relationships between New York and Puerto Rico. The Uniform Princi-
pal and Income Act, and revised Uniform Income and Principal Act of
1962, the Restatement of Trusts 2nd, the Model Spendthrift Trust Statute,
and the Uniform Trusts Act are other source references for provisions of
the proposed Trust Code.
ROBERT A. HENDRICKSON
The New Protocol Relating to
United States-Israel Air Transport
Agreement of 1950*
Introduction
An Air Transport Agreement was signed by the Governments of Israel
and the United States on June 13, 1950.' Israel at that time was making its
very first steps in the field of civil aviation. This Agreement consisted
mainly of an exchange of routes and traffic rights, and a machinery for
determination and approval of tariffs. It granted El Al the right to operate
between Israel and a few intermediate points in Europe and to New York.
*The authors are with the Israel Civil Aviation Administration, International Relations
Department. However, the views expressed herein are the personal views of the authors and do
not have any official standing whatsoever.
'AirTransport Agreement, June 13, 1950, United States-Israel, 3 U.S.T. 4582, T.I.A.S. No
2322.
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On the other hand the Agreement granted TWA the right to operate from
any point in the United States through points in Europe and North Africa to
Israel and also to points beyond Israel.
The Agreement is based historically on the standard text developed at the
Chicago Conference in 19442 and the Bermuda Agreement between the
United States and the United Kingdom of 1946.1 Indeed, since virtually all
bilateral air transport agreements up to the inception of the present revolu-
tion by the CAB related to the basic Chicago or Bermuda scheme, the
Agreement displays a remarkable similarity in many approaches to bilateral
air agreements between other countries. It would therefore be useful to
describe the background to these instruments for the benefit of the nonspe-
cialized practitioner.
The Bermuda agreement was the result of a compromise between the
conflicting preferences of the United States and the United Kingdom. The
first for traditional antitrust considerations, the second for regulation and
administrative limitations as to capacity, frequency, etc. This agreement
consequently was based on the following principles, of which the object was
to exclude unfair competition, and the effect to limit considerably the full
"Five Freedom Rights":'
(i) air transport facilities available to the traveling public should bear a
close relationship to the requirements of the public for such trans-
port;'
'For the text of the Standard Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes adopted at the
International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944, see I PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE 127-29 (1948).
'The Bermuda Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, United States-United Kingdom, 60 Stat. 1499,
T.I.A.S. No. 1507, reproduced in B. Cheng, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT,
app. D, note 1 (1962).
'I.e., the right granted to each other by States which are parties to the 1944 Chicago "Five
Freedoms Agreement." See I PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFER-
ENCE, 179, app. IV (1944). The International Air Transport Agreement was intended as the
vehicle whereby each adhering State would grant to each other adhering State the following
freedoms of the air in respect to scheduled international air services:
(1) The privilege to fly across its territory without landing;
(2) The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes;
(3) The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the territory of the
State whose nationality the aircraft possesses;
(4) The privilege to take on passengers, mail, and cargo destined for the territory of the
State whose nationality the aircraft possesses;
(5) The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of any
other contracting State and the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo coming
from any such territory.
Very few of the world's nations and hardly any of the major air transport operating countries
adhere to this particular agreement, although many have adhered to other portions of the
package of civil aviation documents which were formulated at Chicago in December of 1944
for the conduct of international commercial aviation following World War 11. (The United
States was an early adherent but withdrew in 1946 because of the failure of other countries to
adhere.) Nevertheless, other international air transport agreements are formulated, and in-
ternational air transport is still conducted, with reference to these five "freedoms". Bilateral
arrangements between countries for the provision of air transport services establish or with-
hold the freedoms to varying degrees on a case-by-case approach.
'Concretely, that the primary objective of the air agreement is to operate traffic between the
territories of the contracting parties (third and fourth freedoms).
358 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
(ii) in the operation of the trunk services provided for in the agreement,
the interests of the other governments shall be taken into consider-
ation so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provide
on all or part of the same routes;
(iii) fair and equal opportunity to operate on any international route;
(iv) adjustment of fifth freedom traffic6 with reference (a) to traffic
requirements in the country of origin and the countries of destina-
tion; (b) to the requirements of the area through which the airline
passes after taking into account local and regional services; (c) to
elimination of formulae to predetermine frequencies, etc.;
(d) creation of machinery to obviate unfair competition by unjusti-
fiable increases of frequency or capacity.7
Effect is given to these principles by the inclusion of provisions regarding
capacity, rates or tariffs, and modification of routes.
In 1950, when the Agreement was concluded, New York City dominated
international air transport to the United States. But at some later point the
attractiveness of New York as either a stopover point or a connecting point
diminished, and the positive increase in importance and population growth
of urban centers outside New York has led to much greater interest of
international carriers in serving additional points. In this situation, El Al
was placed in an increasingly difficult position by being the only foreign
carrier limited to serving transatlantic traffic through New York. Its vulner-
ability at New York was increased while flag carriers from other countries
effectively diverted traffic between inland points in the United States and
Israel from El Al, which could not serve these points.
Israel's quest for additional gateways to the United States therefore was
consistent with the famous "equal opportunity" principle of Bermuda-type
agreements. However, in several sessions of protracted negotiations, the
United States was unwilling to adjust the Agreement. United States nego-
tiating considerations at that time were purely commercial, relating mostly
to allocation of economic and commercial benefits to both sides.8 Under
this approach, Israel's main difficulty has been its inability to offer United
States airlines additional facilities for intercontinental traffic. Since geo-
graphical realities did not drastically change, Israel's request seemed futile
as long as the United States did not affect a major change in its negotiating
policy. The United States therefore agreed to change the Agreement only
'The privilege to take on from the territory of the other party passengers, mail and cargo
destined for the territory of a third country and the privilege to put down in the territory of the
other party passengers, mail and cargo coming from such territory.
'See C. Shawcross & K. Geaumont, ON AIR LAW 281 (3d ed. 1966).
'During the last ten years El Al carried about 75 to 80% of the total traffic between the
United States and Israel. This fact underlay the basic argument of the United States in refusing
the grant of additional gateways to El Al.
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upon the advent of a basic reversal of its policy in the field of international
air transportation.
The main prop of this new policy is concern with greater competitive
opportunities for United States and foreign airlines and promotion of new
low-cost transportation options for travelers and shippers. The guiding line
is to trade competitive opportunities, rather than restrictions, with the re-
spective negotiating parties.' It appears that considerations as to relative
potential value of rights exchanged by countries, primary under the prior
Bermuda system, have now become peripheral.
This stated policy stands in clear contradiction to both the spirit and
content of Bermuda-type agreements and mandates their complete redraft-
ing. Accordingly, the United States on March 10, 1978 concluded an Air
Transport Agreement with the Netherlands geared towards liberalization
and limitation of government intervention to traditional antitrust consider-
ations. The subject Protocol, signed between the United States and Israel at
Washington, D.C. on July 18, 1978, is designed to achieve the same end. It
certainly breaks new ground and justifies the following endeavor to clarify
its structure, specific provisions, and bearing upon the future aviation rela-
tions between the two countries.
Overview of the Protocol
The objective of the Protocol apparently is not only an exchange of
routes and traffic rights, but establishment of a novel administrative, legal,
economic and operational regime considered necessary for achievement of
the declared goal of both governments, namely,
(T)o expand air services through elimination of restrictions and to promote an
international aviation system based on competition among airlines in the market
place with minimum government regulation, and ...
To make it possible for airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public low
fare competitive services and increased opportunities for charter air services be-
tween the two countries (The Preamble to the Protocol.)
The 1950 Agreement dealt basically with nine spheres of air relations:
1. Designation of airlines for the operation of agreed services;
2. Procedure for granting the operating authorization;
3. Applicability of national laws and regulations relating to the operation
of aircraft and to admission to or departure from national territory of
passengers and traffic;
4. Acceptance of IATA rate-fixing machinery and procedure relating to
discussions on tariffs;
5. Recognition of aeronautical certificates and licenses;
6. Nondiscrimination in the imposition of airport and other charges;
'See statement issued in March, 1978, entitled United States Policy for Conduct of Interna-
tional Air Transportation Negotiations.
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7. Customs exemptions for fuel, oils, spare parts, etc., destined for use
by aircraft providing service agreed on under the treaty provisions;
8. Amendment and termination of the Agreement;
9. Settlement of disputes.
In addition, the Annex to the Agreement sets forth the exchange of routes
and traffic rights.
The Agreement relates only to scheduled international air transport, not
charter traffic. The Protocol, on the other hand, clearly applies to both
forms of air transportation. Indeed, it structurally bifurcates the provisions
relating to scheduled air services and the provisions relating to charter air
services. And to each category of services, different stipulations apply re-
garding traffic rights, procedure for establishment of tariffs, and applica-
bility of national legislation relating to the operation of aircraft and to
admission to or departure from national territory of passengers and traffic.
Since the Protocol thus relates to both scheduled and charter air services,
the notion of "designated airlines" has a completely different meaning in
the Protocol as compared with that in the Agreement. Bermuda-type air
transportation agreements employ the term "designated airlines" meaning,
in substance, air carrier or carriers duly designated by one party to exercise
the traffic rights specified in the Agreement. These are invariably
scheduled-service airlines, usually the national carrier of the designating
country. However, the Protocol states that "(e)ach party shall be free to
determine the type or types of services which its designated airlines may
operate." Article 2(b) and (c) of the Protocol, read in conjunction with
Articles 3 and 4 thereof, respectively, makes it clear that the term "desig-
nated airline" means practically any airline designated by each party to
carry scheduled or non-scheduled (charter) traffic; and to remove any possi-
ble doubt, Article 2(e) explicitly derogates from the Bermuda-type defini-
tion of this term in the 1950 Agreement.'"
Having clarified the scope and general structure of the subject Protocol,
we now intend to take a closer look at some of its provisions in an effort to




Each party to the Protocol has the right to designate an airline or airlines
for the purpose of exercising scheduled air service rights.
This provision allows stimulation of competition between airlines belong-
ing to the same party. The 1950 Agreement also allowed multiple designa-
tion, specifically in the Annex. But under the Agreement for the purpose of
the implementation of its provisions, the fact of designation was not suffi-
'Air Transport Agreement, supra note 1, art. l(c).
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cient; the carriers had also to be authorized by the other party.'" In contrast,
the Protocol stipulates that upon designation by one party of an airline as
engaged in scheduled air services, such airline shall be permitted to exercise
these rights. The other party cannot intervene to limit the number of airlines
operating such services on the routes between the territory of the first party
and its own territory.
By the terms of Article 3 to the Protocol, routes to be used by an airline
or airlines to be designated by the United States are stated in fairly general
terms, namely: "The United States via intermediate points to Tel-Aviv and
beyond." In the schedule to the 1950 Agreement, the intermediate points
were specified.
On the other hand, such routes to be used by an airline designated by
Israel are stated with particularity. Intermediate points are specifically men-
tioned and four additional gateways in the United States granted, to be
selected by Israel, only two of which may be served until August 1, 1979.
The memorandum of consultations made between the respective delega-
tions concurrent with the Protocol in Section 3 records that "it was under-
stood that Israel could request consultations in the future to consider its
request for traffic rights between United States points and points in South
America and Asia." Pending such consultations, the Protocol stipulates
that Israel does not have traffic rights between Montreal and points in the
United States or between points in and points beyond the United States."
Procedure for Establishment of
Fares, Rates and Prices
The pricing machinery set up in section IX of the Annex to the 1950
Agreement has been completely revised by Article 6 of the present Protocol.
Under the prior system both governments could in effect veto any price
proposal filed by an airline of the other party, but under the new system
intervention possibilities are substantially curtailed, being limited to "pre-
vention of predatory or discriminatory practices, protection of consumers
from the abuse of monopoly position, and protection of airlines from prices
that are artificially low because of direct or indirect governmental subsidy
or support." Moreover, under the new system, effective as of August 1,
1979, although each party may still require scheduled airlines of the other
party to file their fares, rates and prices, neither party can take unilateral
action to prevent the inauguration or continuation of such prices. Con-
cretely, while under the prior system the party objecting to the tariff filed
with it could effectively dispose of the tariff by unilateral action, under the
new system prices only can be disapproved ex post facto by both parties'
agreement. Practically speaking, this means that airlines of one party are
free from ready interference by the other party in their pricing.
"Id. art. 3.
"Id. art. 3(2).
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The Protocol also contains some new provisions regarding third parties
that tend to extend the liberal impact of the Protocol as far as possible. By
the terms of Article 6(E)(ii), the new pricing system shall extend to transpor-
tation between the two parties via the territory of any third country which
has concluded pricing agreements similar to the Protocol with both parties.
And under subparagraph (2) thereof, the parties agree to permit any air-
lines, including airlines of third countries, to match tariffs for service via
third countries, conditional upon reciprocity as to ability to match tariffs.
Note that in addition to the two conditions precedent stated in the Article,
as a prior implied condition to these provisions becoming operative regard-
ing third countries, such countries must possess so-called sixth freedom
rights as to a party, i.e. in order to exercise these rights relating to tariffs the
third country must have appropriate rights to operate under these circum-
stances.
Applicability of National Legislation
The 1950 Agreement contains provisions applying the domestic laws,
rules and regulations of one party to aircraft of the other party. A typical
clause of a Bermuda-type agreement, Article 7 permits the withholding of
the commercial operating authorization (or revoking of such authorization
if already given, or imposing conditions thereon) in certain specified cir-
cumstances involving the qualifications of foreign airlines, their ownership
and control, compliance with the laws and regulations of the country grant-
ing the authorization, or with the conditions prescribed by the Agreement.
One aspect of this situation is the possible procedural complexity, ex-
pense and delay occurring before the respective competent authorities take
affirmative action to permit smooth operation of international traffic.
The Protocol' 3 in general makes it an obligation upon each party to
minimize the administrative burdens of filing requirements and procedures
on airlines of the other party. In addition, the scope of information that
each party may require of airlines of the other party has been substantially
reduced in the Protocol. Under Article 7(f) only such advance information
with regard to flights as is essential for customs, airports, air traffic control
and airport slotting may now be required. Neither party is allowed to limit
the volume or frequency of traffic or the type of aircraft operated by
airlines of the other party, except as may be required for technical, opera-
tional or environmental reasons under uniform conditions'" This very im-
portant provision reverses the Bermuda-type system of the 1950 Agreement
under which all of these could be limited.
"Art. 7(a).
4Art. 5(c)
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Charter Air Services
Traffic Rights
Succinctly stated, Article 4(a) of the Protocol grants complete rights and
unrestricted freedom of international traffic in passengers and cargo for
charter air services covered by the Protocol.
This provision apparently makes it an obligation of both parties to open
their territory to charter flights coming from the territory of the other party,
and also the other way around, i.e., each party agrees to permit airlines of
the other party to carry charter traffic in passengers and cargo to the other
party. Since bilateral air transport agreements in Israel become operative
upon government decision, the import of the subject clause is that upon
such decision charter flights of Israelis to the United States will be per-
mitted. The Protocol does not cover charter traffic originating outside the
territory of both parties or traffic carried by an airline of one party between
the territory of the other party and a third party.
Fares, Rates, and Prices
Filing. This may be required by each party from the following two cate-
gories of airlines:
(a) Airlines designated by that party;
(b) Airlines designated by the other party, as to traffic originating in the
territory of the first party.
But a party may not require price filing from an airline of the other party
when traffic originates in the territory of that other party.
Price Disapproval. Even in cases where filing may be required, such as
when traffic of one party's airline originates in the territory of the other
party, the ban on unilateral action to prevent the inauguration or continua-
tion of fares, rates and prices so filed still applies. The Protocol sets up a
procedure for notification, consultation and concerted action by both par-
ties, during which the prices in question immediately go into effect, or
continue in effect.
Applicability of National Legislation
A party's domestic rules regulate the conduct of all airlines designated by
it. As to airlines designated by the other party:
(a) They must abide by the applicable rules of the party in whose terri-
tory the traffic originates.
(b) The first party can only request a declaration of the airline's confor-
mity to the rules of the other party or a waiver of such rules when the
traffic originates in the other party's territory.
The combined effect of these stipulations is that United States airlines
carrying charter traffic to Israel are no longer required to abide by the Israel
Licensing of Aviation Services (Charter Flights) Regulations, 5736-1976.
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Likewise, Israeli airlines carrying charter traffic to the United States are not
subject to similar CAB regulation.
General Provisions
The Protocol contains various provisions relating to enforcement, secu-
rity and commercial operations.
Article 8 relates to enforcement of the Protocol. It is an unusual provi-
sion in bilateral air agreements, necessary because the Protocol in form and
substance practically derogates from Article II of the Chicago Conven-
tion'" insofar as incoming traffic is concerned.
Thus, while each party may still take such steps as it considers necessary
to regulate the conduct of domestic institutions offering or organizing ser-
vices covered by the Protocol (Art. 8(c)), jurisdiction for enforcement of
aeronautical rules and regulations is exclusive with the party in whose terri-
tory the traffic originates (Art. 8(a)). The stated aim of this stipulation is to
put an end to the practice where the country of destination interferes with
flights originating abroad (Art. 8(b)).
Article 9 relates to aviation security. Besides expressing the obvious con-
cern of both parties for increased security, it adds a paragraph to Article V
of the Agreement, tending to assure concerted action in these matters.
Underlining the importance the parties attach to security, the provision
permits each party to intervene in or interrupt traffic originating in the
territory of the other party if it does not within a reasonable time heed the
first party's requests to take affirmative action to enhance security.
Article 10 of the Protocol sets forth some rules of the economic game
relating to sale of transportation, establishment of airlines' agencies, air-
lines' exemption from taxation, facilitation of transfer of funds accrued by
airlines and currency exchange, etc. Note that the 1950 Agreement did not
include an exemption from taxes on aircraft. In the United States, the
commerce clause 6 gives Congress the exclusive power to regulate foreign
commerce. This clause inherently limits a state's power to tax such com-
merce. However, by analogy to the situation regarding state taxation on
instrumentalities used to convey cargo and passengers interstate, foreign
airlines conceivably might face state taxation. In interstate commerce, the
validity of taxation of airlines by a state depends on whether the airline has
acquired the taxable situs in the taxing state required by the due process
'Art. I I of the Convention reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of the Convention, the laws and regulations of a contracting
state relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in
international air navigation, shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States
without distinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon
entering to or departing from or while within the territory to that State.
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, ICAO Doc.
7300/5 at 5 (1975).
"U.S. CoNST., Amendment 14.
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clause 7 to establish the state's power to tax. If such situs exists within the
particular state, an apportionment is required by the commerce clause to
prevent the intolerable burden on interstate commerce which could result
from multi-state taxation of the same carrier.
Against this background, the foreign practitioner should better under-
stand the bearing of Article 10(g) to the Protocol. This provides for exemp-
tion on a reciprocal basis from taxes, charges and fees imposed by state,
regional and local authorities on the aircraft and regular equipment, etc.
Conclusion
The immediate effect of the Protocol is already felt at the time of this
writing. It is inducing airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public
low-fare competitive services and increased opportunities for charter air
services between the two countries.
Practically speaking, the main impact of the Protocol will be twofold. On
the one hand, designated airlines of one party would no longer be subject to
unilateral intervention by the other party as to tariffs, even if they have
traffic originating in its territory. On the other hand, designated carriers of
one party having charter traffic originating in the territory of that party are
no longer within the penumbra of the oumestic legislation of the other party
as to such traffic.
As a necessary corollary to this deregulation in pricing and control, the
subject Protocol takes a substantial step towards liberalization in traffic
rights by extending to Israeli airlines four additional gateways in the United
States. This will offer a wider choice to the traveling and shipping public,
further stimulate fair competition, and, one hopes, alleviate the grievances
of Israel regarding the basic unfairness of the original Agreement in terms
of commercial and economic opportunities.
From the historic viewpoint the Protocol constitutes a major break-
through in the field of international civil aviation, in respect to the follow-
ing matters:
(1) For the first time, after many rounds of negotiations, Israel obtained
four more landing points in the United States. Until this, the national
carrier of Israel served only New York. The importance of this achievement
is somewhat obscured by the fact that the problem of "beyond" rights, i.e.,
take-off in the United States of traffic destined for a third country, is still
unresolved. According to the new Protocol Israel still has no beyond rights
from the United States.
(2) For the first time in the history of their aeronautical relations, the two
contracting parties have drastically changed the rate-fixing machinery and
established a new system which marks the beginning of an entirely new era
in the field of fares, rates and prices. At the same time one can assume
"U.S. CONST., Amendment 14.
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almost with certainty that for the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) this agreement together with the agreement concluded by the
United States with the Netherlands marks the beginning of the end of an era
which lasted for three decades.
(3) For the first time, instead of controlled competition the parties agreed
to operate on a basis of almost free competition with minimum intervention
from governments. Accordingly the parties agreed not to interfere with
capacity of aircraft, frequencies of flights and the relationship between
national and other traffic.
(4) For the first time, the parties agreed on principles and rules governing
nonscheduled charter flights.
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